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"[Tjhe law does not make mere size an offense .... -1
So spoke the United States Supreme Court almost fifty years ago
when the antitrust laws of the United States were relatively new. At a
time when this country had recently undergone one of the early waves
of mergers and consolidations, Mr. Justice McKenna, writing for the
Court in the United States Steel case,2 asked: "Shall we declare the law
to be that size is an offense even though it minds its own business be-
cause what it does is imitated.. .? [This] corporation is undoubtedly
of impressive size, and it takes an effort of resolution not to be affected
by it or to exaggerate its influence."' The Justice then continued saying:
"we must adhere to the law and the law does not make mere size an
offense or the existence of unexerted power an offense.' 4
A few years later, in United States v. Swift & Co.,5 Mr. Justice
Cardozo said: "Mere size, according to the holding of this court, is
not an offense against the Sherman Act unless magnified to the point
at which it amounts to a monopoly . . . but size carries with it an
opportunity for abuse .... .0
And Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America,7 stated: "The successful competitor, having been urged to
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins."8 True, the court did
find that Alcoa had achieved illegal status. Presumably though this was
not by virtue of size alone but rather of what Justice McKenna would
have called "exerted power" and Justice Cardozo, "abuse."
THE QUESTION
Thus, in three major antitrust cases dealing with the relevance
and importance of size, it is stated that size, as such, is not to be
condemned. In the cascade since these landmark cases, there has been
no decision discovered by this writer which has explicitly taken issue
* Assistant General Counsel, Swift & Company.
' United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
2 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
8 Id. at 451.
4 Id. at 451. (Emphasis added.)
5 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
o Id. at 116.
7 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
8 Id. at 530
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with the doctrine that size, as such, is not a cardinal antitrust sin.
Rather, those opinions which have chosen to address themselves to
size itself have been willing to accept and endorse the holdings in
earlier decisions.
Nevertheless, many lawyers and economists alike have concluded
that the antitrust laws of the United States, particularly those relating
to mergers and acquisitions, are being enforced in a way which penal-
izes bigness and which condemns without trial business conduct en-
gaged in by industry leaders. It is suggested that when a large corporate
defendant is before the bar, there arises a prima facie case of illegality:
that is, bigness is badness unless proven otherwise. Economists, busi-
nessmen, and legal commentators have decried the attitude of the
enforcement agencies and of the courts in their punishing big business
and its successes, in their judging a corporation's conduct and motives
according to the size of its balance sheet, and in their denying to com-
panies already large and successful the opportunity to grow larger and
more successful.9
Professor Jesse Markham ° has cited" Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States"2 as the inception point of the "bigness is badness" philosophy.
In criticizing the soundness of this philosophy, he has pointed out that
"bigness" and "market power," like obesity and pregnancy, are condi-
tions which look somewhat the same but require markedly different
remedies.
Professor Carl Kaysen, co-author of the book, Antitrust Policy,' 3
and Associate Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration,
Harvard University, has noted that overall bigness "is not relevant
to the issue of monopoly and competition; it is only bigness or small-
ness in relation to particular markets which is relevant to that issue." 4
9 Address by John T. Chadwell, Competition and Section 1 of the Sherman Act-
Instant Antitrust or Long Run Policy, Spring 1965 Meeting of Section on Antitrust Law
of the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.; Kaplan, Big Enterprise in a Com-
petitive System, 200-01 (1964); Love, Wall St. Journal April 12, 1965, p. 14, col. 4;
Seminar of the National Industrial Conference Board, "The Present War on Bigness";
Fourth Conference on Antitrust in an Expanding Economy, March 4, 1965; Address
by M.J. Rathbone, A Businessman's View of Some Antitrust Problems-Particularly
Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Size, Spring 1965 Meeting, Section of Antitrust Law,
American Bar Association, Washington, D.C. in 27 A.BA. Antitrust Section 56 (1965).
10 Professor of Economics, Princeton University, former chief of the Bureau of
Economics of the Federal Trade Commission.
11 "The Present War on Bigness," Seminar of the National Industrial Conference
Board, Fourth Conference on Antitrust in an Expanding Economy, March 4, 1965.
12 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
13 Kaysen & Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis (1959).
14 Supra note 11. One of the problems encountered in studying this question is
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Professor Robert Knox added that many "managers and directors of
corporate enterprise ... feel that the 'grow from within' dictum that
is emerging from recent Supreme Court decisions on mergers is an
unduly restrictive interpretation of the economic objectives of the
antitrust laws."'51 A former corporate executive asks whether arithmetic
alone should be enough to place the burden of proof of non-violation
on the accused. 6
Are we developing a body of merger law which will make legal
only those acquisitions and mergers which can clearly be proven to
result in no advantage whatsoever to the acquiring company, no econo-
mies of scale, no edge in the competitive race, no management attrac-
tion?' If such a doctrine is to prevail, perhaps the next step is to
amend the pertinent statutes to flatly and totally prohibit the acquisi-
tion by one corporation of the stock or assets of another.
At least one Supreme Court Justice has expressed concern about
the view that bigness is bad. Distressed by the majority opinion in
the Lexington Bank case,'" an opinion which emphasized the size
of the merger participants, Mr. Justice Harlan struck out at the "in-
vocation of formulas of antitrust numerology." He saw the Court's
one of definition. Distinctions between the various aspects of size of the companies
involved are not always dearly made in the legal and economic antitrust literature,
including the opinions of courts and regulatory agencies. There is often a tendency to
blur the lines between: (1) absolute size, as measured by sales, assets, number of
employees, etc.; (2) rank in the industry, or in all manufacturing, or among all
corporations; (3) relative size, measured by capacity or market share; and (4) dis-
parate size, or difference in size among competitors. In addition, the number of sellers
in a market may be an important consideration regardless of the dimensions of size
listed above. For a discussion of several of these aspects and their relevance to effective
competition in the economic sense, see Atty Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 325-26
(1955).
15 Bus. Topics, March-June 1965, p. 42.
16 Address by M.J. Rathbone, supra note 9. See United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
1964 Trade Cas., II 71298 (D.R.I.), a recent decision where the court said that a rebut-
table presumption of monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act arose when the
government had established that defendant had a predominant share of the relevant
market. Defendant's burden of rebuttal could be met only by showing that its posi-
tion was traceable to "superiority in means and methods which are 'honestly industrial."'
In Permanente Cement Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16885 (April 24, 1964), the FTC found
a merger to be "within the presumption of unlawfulness established in Philadelphia
Bank" and that Permanente had not made the "dear showing" required by Philadelphia
Bank to overcome the presumption.
17 At least one recognized antitrust authority, Professor Robert H. Bork of the
Yale University Law School, seems to fear this possibility. Address by Robert H. Bork,
American Bar Association Symposium, August 1963 Meeting of the ABA, 23 A.B.A.
Antitrust Section 319 (1963).
Is United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
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opinion as amounting to "a presumption that in the antitrust field
good things come usually, if not always, in small packages." 19 The
conclusion of the Court that the merger was violative of the Sherman
Act, said Justice Harlan, "collapses into the agreed premise that First
Security [the resultant merger] is 'big.' "
Of course, not all agree that the courts are developing a per se
attitude outlawing acquisitions by major companies. Commissioner
Elman of the Federal Trade Commission stated that the Commission
most emphatically was not adopting any view that
bigness per se is anti-competitive or undesirable and should be at-
tacked under Section 7 or any other antitrust statute.... [S]ize is
significant... only insofar as it is hugely disparate compared with
the size of the firms in the relevant market.
21
So the exchange of views goes on. Is the current enforcement of
Clayton Act section 722 merely a broad scale attack on big business,
or is it the result of an objective, meaningful analysis of market be-
havior and likely market consequences made under appropriate con-
gressional mandate? Do the antimerger laws allow room for selective,
nonobjectionable corporate acquisitions by major companies; or have
members of the Fortune 500 Club 23 achieved a status rendering them
legally ineligible for further growth by merger?
MERGERS AND MARKETS
"Mergers and Markets," an economic study by Dr. Betty Bock,
analyzes 1964 Supreme Court merger cases along with the complaints
filed by the government that year.24 The study considers the several
rules and criteria controlling the Court's decisions in these cases, and
seeks to suggest which factors are likely to be important in future
cases. Our interest is in the criterion of size.
Dr. Bock's study includes all merger cases initiated by the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Between 1951,
when the 1950 amendment to the Merger Act became effective, and
1964, the Department and the Commission filed 143 complaints, each
attacking an acquisition, or series of acquisitions, on the ground that
19 Id. at 673.
20 Id. at 673, 679.
21 Procter & Gamble Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 16673, at 21582 (Nov. 26, 1963). This
case is presently pending on appeal in the Sixth Circuit.
22 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1965).
23 "The 500 Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations," published annually by Fortune
Magazine.
24 Bock, Mergers and Markets, Studies in Business Economics, No. 87 (4th ed.
1965).
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competition may have been substantially lessened or that a tendency
toward monopoly was possible. Twenty-one of these cases were initi-
ated in 1964. Facts concerning the absolute size of the acquiring or
acquired company, or both, are alleged in approximately two-thirds
of the merger complaints: that is, in less than one-third of the cases
absolute size was not deemed to be material to the government's case.
Indeed, the criterion of absolute size appears in more of the com-
plaints than any factor other than market position and degree of con-
centration in the markets affected. Dr. Bock's statistics also show that
the enforcement agencies' interests have been moving towards acqui-
sitions of larger dimensions. Prior to 1964, the lowest annual sales
figure alleged in complaints filed was 8 million dollars. By 1964, the
lowest annual sales figure alleged was almost 60 million dollars.
Similarly, the minimum asset size of acquired companies increased
from about 8 million dollars valuation in the pre-1964 complaint period
to ten times that size in 1964. Another measure of the increasing
interest of the enforcement agencies in the larger companies is reported
by Dr. Bock: during the pre-1964 period somewhat less than half of
the companies whose sales figures were cited in complaints enjoyed
annual sales volume in excess of 100 million dollars; in 1964 more
than two-thirds of the companies were in this "100 million dollar and
over)) group.
These figures and others lead Dr. Bock to conclude that:
[I] t appears clear that the agencies are increasingly directing their
attention to acquisitions by the larger companies of relatively large
companies, or parts of companies .... Indeed, by 1964, the enforce-
ment agencies appeared to have adopted a policy of avoiding attacks
on smaller acquisitions by smaller companies in order to concentrate
on the larger acquisitions by the larger companies in the more con-
centrated markets. 25
THE STATUTES
26
In 1950 Congress enacted the Celler-Kefauver amendment27 to
section 7 of the Clayton Act. The amendment broadened the pro-
25 Id. at 18-19 (Emphasis added.)
26 Bank Merger Act, 76 Stat. 953 (1962), 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1964); Kefauver-
Celler Acquisition of Corporate Stock Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964);
Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-55 (1964); Securities
Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hhl (1964); Packers and Stock-
yards Act, 42 Stat. 159 (1921), 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229 (1964); Federal Power Act, 41
Stat. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823 (1964); The Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730
(1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964); Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914),
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1964); The Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1964) ; Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1964).
27 As amended, the pertinent paragraph of Clayton Act section 7 provides:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
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scriptions of the Act to cover the acquisitions of assets as well as
previously covered stock purchases. It also eliminated the requirement
that the affected corporations be in horizontal competition one with
the other; thus for the first time so-called vertical acquisitions (i.e.,
acquisitions of one's suppliers or customers) and conglomerates (all
others having requisite anticompetitive effects) were reached. The
amended section 7 is totally lacking in any reference to "size," rela-
tive size, or disparity of size. What the courts have concluded as to
the relevance and importance of size, absolute or relative, is another
matter.
While section 7 of the Clayton Act is the key antimerger statutory
provision, other federal statutes must be reckoned with as well. Section
1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal "every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce," and section 2 of that Act declares "every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States" guilty of a misdemeanor. At
least one of the recent major merger cases was brought under the
Sherman Act.28
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits
"unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce," has been urged by the government and
found by the Federal Trade Commission to be broad enough to reach
acquisitions not within the ambit of the Clayton Act. 9 In addition,
provisions restricting and limiting acquisitions and mergers may be
found in other special industry regulatory statutes such as the Com-
munications Act, Securities Exchange Act, Interstate Commerce Act,
Federal Power Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, and the Bank Merger
Act.30
Tm CASES
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States
The Supreme Court first interpreted the amended section 7 in
1962 when the acquisition of the G.R. Kinney Company, Inc. by the
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.
28 United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Lexington, supra note 18.
20 Beatrice Foods Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 17244 (April 26, 1965).
80 Supra note 26.
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Brown Shoe Company, Inc. was found to be in violation thereof."'
The Court's opinion includes a review of the legislative history of the
Act and its 1950 amendment. The characteristics and background of
the industry and companies involved were traced. Also, the Court re-
viewed all appropriate "factors" in light of which the merger is con-
sidered, analyzing the vertical and horizontal aspects of the transaction.
For our purposes we need not deal with all of the considerations
which entered into the Court's finding that the merger did contravene
the standards of the Act, and that the acquisition could reasonably be
expected to lessen competition substantially or to tend to create a mo-
nopoly in a line of commerce or a section of the country. This case
is principally significant here because in it, the first case under amended
section 7, the Court emphasized the size of the two merging companies.
In the very first sentence of the factual description of the case,
the Court describes the acquiring corporation as "the third largest
seller of shoes by dollar volume in the United States, a leading manu-
facturer of men's, women's, and children's shoes, and a retailer with
over 1,230 owned, operated or controlled retail outlets," and the ac-
quired corporation as "the eighth largest company, by dollar volume,
among those primarily engaged in selling shoes, itself a large manu-
facturer of shoes, and a retailer with over 350 retail outlets." And
at a later point in the opinion the Court also says of the acquired
company: "Kinney, with over 350 retail outlets, owned and operated
the largest independent chain of family shoe stores in the Nation."32
With the stage thus set, the characters portrayed as "large" and
"leading," the Court finds little trouble brushing aside Brown's urgings
that there could be no serious diminution of competition resulting
from a merger where the acquired company manufactured less than
0.5 percent and retailed less than 2 percent of the nation's shoes.
Indeed, Brown itself produced only 4 percent of the national produc-
tion, not a staggering percentage figure. 3
In comparison with the industrial giants, neither Brown nor Kin-
ney can reasonably be characterized as large.34 If this case has signifi-
cance on the issue of size, it would seem to be the indication that
merging companies need not be among the mammoths of the nation
to invite application of section 7. Brown, which accounted for less
than one-twentieth of the nation's shoe production, seemed to have
31 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
32 Id. at 297, 331.
33 Id. at 298, 303.
34 Supra note 24. Brown, after the acquisition, was not among the 250 largest United
States companies, asset-wise.
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been considered a large company, although the merger did make it
one of the top four shoe producers.3 ' An interesting statistic cited by the
Court, presumably to add stature to Brown's industry position, is that
the top four shoe manufacturers (of which Brown was the smallest)
together produced 65 percent of the volume of shoes produced by
the top 24 shoe manufacturers in the country.36 The relevance of this
particular combination of figures is somewhat elusive.
It seems clear that factors other than absolute size were deemed
important by the Court in arriving at its decision in this case. Par-
ticularly emphasized was the evidence of fast moving trends of con-
centration in the industry, of integration between manufacturing and
retailing, and of acquisitions in the industry generally and by Brown
Shoe specifically. The Court found
"a definite trend" for the parent-manufacturers to supply an ever
increasing percentage of the retail outlets' needs, thereby foreclosing
other manufacturers from effectively competing for the retail ac-
counts ....
Another "definite trend" found to exist in the shoe industry
was a decrease in the number of plants manufacturing shoes.37
Brown Shoe was found not only to have been a participant but a
"moving factor," in these industry trends.38 An impressive list of
acquisitions by Brown of retail outlets is contained in the opinion; it
is also pointed out that Brown previously acquired the stock or assets
of several companies engaged solely in shoe manufacturing.
3 9
35 Id. at 302-03.
?6 Id. at 300.
87 Id. at 301.
38 Id. at 302.
39 Id. at 302-03. The Court said:
Although Brown had experimented several times with operating its own retail
outlets, by 1945 it had disposed of them all. However, in 1951, Brown again
began to seek retail outlets by acquiring the Nation's largest operator of leased
shoe departments, Wohl Shoe Company (Wohl), which operated 250 shoe de-
partments in department stores throughout the United States. Between 1952
and 1955 Brown made a number of smaller acquisitions: Wetherby-Kayser
Shoe Company (three retail stores), Barnes & Company (two stores), Reilly
Shoe Company (two leased shoe departments), Richardson Shoe Store (one
store), and Wohl Shoe Company of Dallas (not connected with Wohl) (leased
shoe departments in Dallas). In 1954, Brown made another major acquisition:
Regal Shoe Corporation which, at the time, operated one manufacturing plant
producing men's shoes and 110 retail outlets.
The acquisition of these corporations was found to lead to increased sales
by Brown to the acquired companies. Thus although prior to Browns acquisi-
tion of Wohl in 1951, Wohl bought from Brown only 12.8% of its total pur-
chases of shoes, it subsequently increased its purchases to 21.4% in 1952 and
1966]
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With respect to concentration, the record shows that in certain
markets or submarkets the combined Brown-Kinney share of the busi-
ness approximated 50 percent. In others it ranged from 33 percent to
50 percent. 40 Certainly these regional figures are of a somewhat dif-
ferent order of magnitude than the national figures of 0.5 percent and
2 percent cited in testimony of the defendants.
Particularly significant, not only to the disposition of this case
but as a prelude to future Court action in section 7 cases, is the
emphasis placed on the legislative history of the 1950 amendment.
First, the Court broadly summarizes its review of the legislative his-
tory by stating that it has discerned no "unmistakably clear indication
of the precise standards the Congress wished the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the courts to apply in judging the legality of particular
mergers. 41 It did, however, find several expressions of consistent points
of view sufficient to form a "usable frame of reference within which
to evaluate any given merger. '' 4
The Court found "the dominant theme" to be "a fear of what was
considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American
economy. ' 43 Hence, attention was given to the concentration and
integration trends evident in the instant case. Presumably this "domi-
nant theme" is sufficient to fully dispose of the Brown Shoe merger.
Beyond this, however, the Court lays great stress on indications
in the legislative history that the framers of the amendments sought
to guard against acquisitions of large companies by large companies
and did not intend to restrict or prevent mergers between smaller
business entities. The Court points out: "When concern as to the Act's
breadth was expressed, supporters of the amendments indicated that
it would not impede, for example, a merger between two small com-
panies to enable the combination to compete more effectively with
larger corporations . ,, " According to the Court, this is consistent
to 32.6% in 1955. Wetherby-Kayser's purchases from Brown increased from
10.4% before acquisition to over 50% after. Regal, which had previously sold
no shoes to Wohl and shoes worth only $89,000 to Brown, in 1956 sold shoes
worth $265,000 to Wohl and $744,000 to Brown. During the same period of
time, Brown also acquired the stock or assets of seven companies engaged solely
in shoe manufacturing. As a result, in 1955, Brown was the fourth largest shoe
manufacturer in the country producing about 25.6 million pairs of shoes or
about 4% of the Nation's total footwear production.
40 Id. at 347-54.
41 Id. at 315.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Id. at 319. In the congressional discourse, 95 Cong. Rec. 11486-87 (1949), Repre-
sentative Celler said:
The objection that the suggested amendment would prohibit small com-
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with the deletion by Congress of the word "community" in the original
Act's description of the relevant geographic market. That deletion is
"another illustration of Congress' desire to indicate that its concern
panies from merging has strangely enough been put forward by representatives
of big business. This would seem almost like "Greeks bearing gifts."
Incidentally, several small business associations interested in the welfare of
small business and the maintenance of free enterprise testified very vigorously
in support of this bill. No small-business group appeared against it.
There is no real basis for this objection.
In the first place, the present language of section 7 as it relates to mergers
by sale of stock is more restrictive than the language in the amended bill.
Yet no case has been found where a small corporation had any difficulty or
was criticized by the Federal Trade Commission for selling its business by
selling its stock to another small corporation. The small corporations have not
had to avoid the present language of section 7 by selling their assets in place
of their stock, when they wanted to dispose of their business. Furthermore,
the evidence shows that it is only in large acquisitions by large corporations,
which would have a tendency to create a monopoly, where resort is had to the
device of purchasing assets in lieu of capital stock when a merger is planned.
Attention is also called to the list of acquisitions. None of these involve small
corporations selling to other small corporations.
(Emphasis added.)
And Senator O'Conor, at 96 Cong. Rec. 16436 (1950) stated:
I think it is worth while to bear in mind the following considerations: First,
as I have already indicated, the facts reveal that the great bulk of the mergers
which have taken place in recent years have consisted of the absorption of a
small company by a large company; the cases of two small companies merging
are few and far between.
Second, the bill is aimed at preventing only those mergers which substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Obviously, those mergers
which enable small companies to compete more effectively with giant corpora-
tions generally do not reduce competition but rather intensify it.
Third, by a specific action, Congress has made it abundantly clear that it
is not the purpose of this law to prevent mergers of this type. Thus, the
original wording of section 7 of the Clayton Act, which, with regard to stock,
is now on the statute books, prohibits a corporation from acquiring a com-
petitor "where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition between
the corporation whose stock is acquired and the corporation making the ac-
quisition." Had this language been rigidly interpreted, it would have had the
effect of preventing any company from buying the stock of any competitor,
since the acquisition by one firm of a competitor not only "substantially lessens"
but completely eliminates the competition which had formerly existed between
them.
In the bill before us this stringent prohibition has been completely deleted.
Instead of making the test of the law the effect of an acquisition on competi-
tion between the acquired and the acquiring companies, the proposed bill
substitutes the more general test of the effect on competition generally in any
line of commerce in any section of the country. And to come within the pro-
hibition of the bill the effect on that competition must be "substantial."
(Emphasis added.)
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was with the adverse effects of a given merger on competition only
in an economically significant 'section' of the country."'
The considerable emphasis with which the Court stresses the evi-
dence of congressional intent to permit mergers by small but not large
companies suggests a policy was being enunciated for future applica-
tion in cases whose facts are more appropriate to invoke the "Big vs.
Little" philosophy.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank
Closely following the Brown Shoe case came Supreme Court con-
sideration of the merger of two major Philadelphia banks. 6 The
opinion in that case is streamlined for the Court saw no need to repeat
or extend its analysis of the statutory test of the Brown Shoe case. In-
stead, it concluded that the "case present[ed] only a straightforward
problem of application to particular facts."47 Thereupon the Court
straightforwardly found almost per se illegal any merger which places
30 percent or more of the market in the hands of the merged firms. The
Court said that mergers which concentrate control of large market
shares are inherently suspect and therefore ripe for injunction unless
it be clearly Shown that the feared anticompetitive effects will not
occur.
48
This left the Court only the task of determining at what point size
requires that a given merger be characterized as "inherently suspect."
The Court's answer is in terms of market concentration:
The merger of appellees will result in a single bank's controlling at
least 30%o of the commercial banking business in the four-county
Philadelphia metropolitan area. Without attempting to specify the
smallest market share which would still be considered to threaten
undue concentration, we are clear that 30% presents that threat.49
Thus the Court concluded that any merger which results in not less
than 30 percent of the market being held by the merged firms is illegal
45 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 31, at 320.
46 United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
47 Id. at 355.
48 Id. at 363. Mr. justice Brennan, writing for the Court, said:
we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the con-
centration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing
that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects ....
Such a test lightens the burden of proving illegality only with respect to
mergers whose size makes them inherently suspect . ...
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
49 Id. at 364.
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in the absence of a clear showing that the presumed anticompetitive
effects will not obtain.50
What comfort is to be taken from the suggestion by the Court that
the presumption is rebuttable? The opinion itself offers very little en-
couragement. The Court regarded as "entitled to little weight" com-
petitors' testimony that bank competition in Philadelphia would con-
tinue to be vigorous after the merger. It also found "of equally little
value" the testimony that customers had ample alternative banking
facilities available following the merger." One wonders why the testi-
mony of competitors of merger participants is not valuable on the
question of the vigor of competition in their industry and market. Also,
why is evidence regarding the availability of alternative sources of the
product or service involved likewise not relevant and important in
an antitrust case? At least it should be given better treatment than
being waved aside as "lay evidence" on a "complex economic-legal
problem" not entitled to the reliance placed on it by the district court."2
With such areas of testimony discredited in favor of bare-bones arith-
metic on share of the market, the evidentiary burden laid down in
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank does come perilously close to a per se ruling.
Numerology seems to be determinative.
But does this case stand for the proposition that absolute size is
the determining factor in measuring a merger against the standards of
section 7? There is little indication in the opinion that the absolute
size of the merging institutions was determinative of the result. The
numerology which impressed the Court here was in terms of percent-
ages rather than absolute size dimensions.
The opinion does begin by pointing out that the two merging
banks are the second and third largest in the Philadelphia area and
that they will become number one if the merger is allowed. 3 But the
interest of the Court is directed mainly towards concentration figures
rather than power attributable to size alone. In fact, it is the defend-
ants who press the size argument by urging that the resulting bank,
with its greater prestige and increased lending limit, would be better
50 It should be noted that although the Court seems disposed to simplify the ground
rules for determining the illegality of mergers and with the establishment of the "30%
or over is illegal" rule, it took care to point out that no corollary to this rule should
be presumed; i.e., a merger accounting for less than 30% of the market is not neces-
sarily legitimate under section 7. Nor is there any rebuttable inference created by the
less than 30% statistic.
51 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 46, at 367.
52 Ibid.
53 Id. at 330-31.
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able to compete with the large out-of-state banks.54 The argument did
not prevail. Presumably size, as such, is not deemed conclusive either
way in the Philadelphia Nat'l Bank case.
Procter & Gamble Co.
The Federal Trade Commission decision in Procter & Gamble
Co.,5 followed the Brown Shoe and Philadelphia Bank cases, and it
perhaps best illuminates the relevance and importance of size as a
factor in determining the legality of a merger. Under consideration by
the Commission was Procter's acquisition of Clorox.
The statement of facts in the Commission's decision credits Proc-
ter with being one of the nation's fifty largest manufacturers, with total
net sales in 1957 of 1,156,000,000 dollars. While Procter manufactured
a wide range of household consumer items sold through grocery, drug,
and department stores, it did not, prior to the acquisition of Clorox,
produce household liquid bleach. In packaged detergents, Procter's
sales were almost a half billion dollars and accounted for 54.5 percent
of the national total. In the household cleaning agents industry, Procter
and its two largest competitors accounted for more than 80 percent of
the total sales, Procter being the leading firm of the three.
At the time of the acquisition, Clorox was the nation's leading
manufacturer of household liquid bleach with annual sales of slightly
less than 40,000,000 dollars which represented almost 50 percent of the
national total. Clorox and its next largest competitor accounted for
almost 65 percent of the nation's household liquid bleach sales and
these two together with the next largest four manufacturers accounted
for almost 80 percent.
The acquired corporation had not been in competition with the
acquiring corporation nor had either been a customer or supplier of
the other. Hence, the acquisition could not be easily characterized as
either horizontal or vertical. Accordingly, the hearing examiner had
treated it as a "conglomerate" acquisition. 6 However, the Federal
Trade Commission noted that it constituted a "merger of sellers of
functionally closely related products which are not, however, close sub-
stitutes," and the Commission decided to style it as a "variant of the
conventional horizontal merger.11 7 After considering the several re-
spects in which liquid bleach is compatible with and related to the
major product lines of Procter the Commission concluded:
54 Id. at 370.
55 Trade Reg. Rep. 1 16673 (Nov. 26, 1963). This case is pending appeal in the
Sixth Circuit.
56 Id. at 21565.
57 Ibid.
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By this acquisition, then, Procter has not diversified its interests in
the sense of expanding into a substantially different, unfamiliar
market or industry. Rather, it has entered a market which adjoins,
as it were, those markets in which it is already established, and
which is virtually indistinguishable from them insofar as the prob-
lems and techniques of marketing the product to the ultimate con-
sumer are concerned5 8
Having thus characterized the acquisition as a semiconglomerate,
i.e., a variant of a horizontal merger, the Commission noted the absence
of authoritative, specific precedents in this area, and undertook to
review basic principles with respect to the interpretation and applica-
tion of section 7 and to enunciate guidelines for future decisions relat-
ing to such mergers. Our interest is in the significance which is given
the size of the merging companies.
The Commission felt the merger would give rise to substantial
cost savings and other advantages in advertising and sales promotion,
especially in television advertising. Specifically, greater annual volume
discounts are available to the largest network television advertisers;
similar advantages exist with other advertising media. Thus, the ac-
quisition by Procter enables Clorox to pare its advertising budget, an
advantage unavailable to its smaller competitors.
Replying to the defendant's argument that advantages of scale
should not be relied upon to find a merger unlawful and thus to penalize
efficiency, the Commission asserts that the "efficiencies [of] the kind
involved in this merger, far from representing a net social benefit, [are]
independently offensive to at least the spirit, if not the letter, of the
antitrust laws." Such savings, says the Commission, are "achievable
only by firms of very large absolute size [and] bear little relationship
to ordinary notions of economic 'efficiency.' " Apparently, if bigness
is evil, benefits flowing from bigness must, too, be "offensive."
The Commission discusses in considerable detail other advantages
which accrued to Clorox upon being acquired by a large household con-
sumer products company. Among those mentioned were the possibility
of joint product promotion and the opportunity to pressure retailers
into giving favored treatment to Clorox. Another important conse-
quence of the merger is the advent, in the liquid bleach industry, of a
58 Id. at 21566.
59 Id. at 21585.
60 Id. at 21585-86. Aside from dollar savings, the Commission points out that a
multi-product national advertiser like Procter, which can arrange for its commercial
announcements to occur during the course of the program period, has a distinct ad-
vantage over the smaller single product advertiser whose commercial messages will be
inserted during the between-program station breaks.
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firm with a breadth of experience and degree of financial strength
beyond anything possessed by the other industry members. Financial
ability enables the seller to offer a special price to the merchant so
regional price cutting will now be one of the tools available to advance
the cause of Clorox. The Commission envisioned that "in a price fight
to the finish, Procter, whose aggregate scale of operations and fiscal
resources dwarf the entire liquid bleach industry, can hardly be
bested."61 It was suggested that "Procter... may engage in systematic
underpricing having most unfair and destructive effects even though
the firm is wholly innocent of any predatory intent."62
Quite apart from these several "concrete competitive advantages"
which stem from Procter's acquisition of Clorox, the Commission found
that "some account must be taken of certain intangibles ... [includ-
ing] Procter's history of success, its general size and its prowess, which
loom large in the eyes of the small liquid bleach firms, [and which]
must for that reason alone be reckoned significant competitive fac-
tors.
6 3
The Commission's sensitivity to size is again reflected in the view
that "a small or medium-sized firm contemplating entry cannot ignore
the fact that Procter is a billion dollar corporation whose marketing
experience extends far beyond the limited horizons of the liquid bleach
industry and whose aggregate operations are several times greater than
those of all the firms in the industry combined."64 This sensitivity is
also reflected in the statement that, as a general principle of section 7
interpretation, "financial strength and large absolute size may be indis-
pensable attributes in enabling a substantial market share to be ac-
quired and maintained in" an industry such as the one under con-
sideration.65
In summary, it is probably fair to say that the size factor totally
permeates this opinion. True, the Commission insists that it is not big-
ness per se which is being attacked but rather disparity of size and
consequences of size which obtain in the special circumstances of this
case.66 However, if overpowering advantage is attributed to size (as it
is in the Procter opinion), the approach to consideration of a merger
of "large" companies most likely includes a strongly weighted presump-
tion of illegality.
61 Id. at 21578.
62 Ibid.
63 Id. at 21578-79.
64 Id. at 21579.
65 Id. at 21571.
66 Id. at 21582.
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SUBSEQUENT ADJUDICATIONS
In merger law, lower court decisions seem to be peculiarly un-
reliable as an indication of what the law is. Accordingly, this paper will
not attempt a general coverage of lower court decisions.67 It is worthy
of note, however, that the first half dozen or so merger cases to be
decided at the district court level following the Brown Shoe decision
all resulted in decisions upholding the validity of the challenged
merger."' For a year or so, while these cases were decided, defense
counsel enjoyed a surge of encouragement. This was despite the fact
that the Brown Shoe decision itself had been generally regarded as a
significant victory for the government and was expected to result in the
outlawing of any merger with potential competitive effect of any
substance.
The epidemic of losses sustained by the Government in these post-
Brown Shoe decisions evokes a question: Do recent trial court deci-
sions in merger cases indicate a trend toward narrowing the scope of
section 7 of the Clayton Act? The answer is no. Supreme Court deci-
sions made it clear that in the field of merger law trial court decisions
67 One recent district court decision suggests the possibility of an interesting ex-
pansion of the doctrine of "no acquisitions by large companies permitted." In Smith-
Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 1965 Trade Cas., ff 71485 (Feb. 1, 1965),
plaintiff sought to recover damages from Sylvania alleging that a series of earlier ac-
quisitions had enhanced the competitive position of Sylvania to the detriment of small
companies with limited resources (including plaintiff), who prior to Sylvania's entry
alone produced lighting equipment for the amateur motion picture photographer. Syl-
vania entered this line of commerce after the complained of acquisition by General Tele-
phone and Electronics Corporation, which merger allegedly provided Sylvania with a
new "deep pocket" set of advantages. The court denied recovery, pointing out that
in all of the cases decided earlier under section 7, at least one of the companies involved
in the merger or acquisition had been engaged in the relevant line of commerce at the
time the merger or acquisition was consummated. This was not so in the instant case.
The court said: "If the plaintiff's complaint were upheld, a competitor could ask the
court to prevent any large company that had a history of mergers from entering into
competition in any new field that is comprised of small competitors." The district court
was unwilling to thus "increase the scope of Section 7." It will be interesting to see
whether the Supreme Court is equally reluctant if this case comes before it.
68 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964), reversing un-
reported dismissal by United States District Court for the District of Utah; FTC v.
Consol. Foods, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States
v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 441 (1964);
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963), rev'd, 378
U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. Lever Bros., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd,
377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Bliss & Laughlin, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.
Cal. 1962), vacated, 371 U.S. 70 (1962).
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have been mere way-stations to reversal. In every case save one, the
Supreme Court determined the merger involved to be illegal. 9
With the pattern "approval by the lower court, reversal on appeal"
the rule, the key question for defense counsel became: Will the Solicitor
General carry my case to the Supreme Court?
The following is a review of the post-Brown Shoe cases.
The Lexington Bank Case"
In this case the Government claimed that the merger of two major
banks in Lexington, Kentucky, was violative of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. This case is principally significant in that it is the first
adjudication which challenged a merger under the Sherman Act since
the amendment of section 7 of the Clayton Act.71 However, the case is
also significant as one in which size, absolute or relative, was an im-
portant factor.
Prominent among "facts relative to the alleged restraint of trade
under the Sherman Act," are: (1) the size of First National, the acquir-
ing bank, and its five competitors including Security Trust, the ac-
quired bank, and (2) the market concentration figures of the banking
institutions in Lexington before and after the merger. The Court con-
cludes that significant competition would be eliminated by the merger,
and it emphasizes testimony in the record that "the 'image' of 'bigness'
is a powerful attraction to customers, an advantage that increases pro-
gressively with disparity in size." Also stressed were the multiplicity of
extra services which the new company could offer in the trust field
which extra services would tend to foreclose competition there.72
The Court then cited Northern Sec. Co. v. United States7' for the
Sherman Act holding that "it was enough that the two [merger partic-
ipants] competed, that their competition was not insubstantial, and
that the combination put an end to it." 4
Why, if the sole test being applied is whether or not the two banks
engage in substantial competition, is the size of the merging institutions
stressed? Why the reference to indicia of size and "image of bigness"?
69 Ibid. However, in Penn-Oln, the District Court for the District of Maryland
on remand from the Supreme Court in a decision unreported at the date of writing
held the Government failed to sustain the burden of establishing a reasonable prob-
ability that either Pennsalt or Olin Mathieson would have entered the market on its
own. Accordingly, the court entered a judgment dismissing the case.
70 United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
71 Id. at 679. Mr. Justice Harlan observes that the case is not really a Sherman
Act case but "is, if anything, a Clayton Act case masquerading in the garb of the
Sherman Act."
72 Id. at 668-69.
73 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
74 United States v. First Natl Bank of Lexington, supra note 70, at 670.
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Perhaps the Court has fallen into a pattern of laying stress on the size
of the merging firms and does so as a matter of habit, even in cases
where size is not critical to the decision.
In any event, the Lexington Bank case appears to view size as a
condemnable characteristic, even though Mr. Justice Harlan perhaps
goes a bit far in saying (in dissent) that the only factual basis for the
Court's decision rests on "the statistics unquestionably showing that
First National and Security Trust (the merging banks) were big and
First Security (the merged bank) is bigger." His prediction that the
majority opinion in this case is a "bludgeon" which will now be used
against "combinations which may well have no fault except 'bigness'"
seems a trifle too gloomy."
United States v. El Paso Nat'l Gas Co.78
This is probably not one of the more critical cases concerning the
size of merging companies. El Paso, the sole out-of-state supplier of gas
into the California market, acquired Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp.
The latter company had not been supplying gas to California customers
but had recently made plans to enter that market and had reached
tentative agreement to serve the California gas needs of one of El
Paso's major customers there.
The acquired company was described in the Supreme Court
opinion as "no feeble, failing company" but one of two "major inter-
state pipelines serving the trans-Rocky Mountain States .... It had
adequate reserves and managerial skill," and "it was so strong and
militant that it was viewed with concern, and coveted, by El Paso." All
of this qualified it as important potential competition, the absorption
of which violated section 7.7
While the case is more notable in its holding that approval by a
federal regulatory agency under a special industry regulation statute
does not create antitrust law immunity (the Federal Power Commis-
sion had approved this merger before the Department of Justice com-
menced action), the opinion is consistent with a view that size in a
given market is an important, if not the controlling, factor in the evalu-
ation of a merger.
The Rome Cable Case78
This decision is perhaps the most significant "size" decision of the
Supreme Court under amended section 7. Alcoa has long been one of
75 United States v. First Natl Bank of Lexington, supra note 70, at 680.
76 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
77 Id. at 661-62.
78 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
1966]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the industrial giants of the United States. It should not have come as
a surprise, then, when the United States Supreme Court struck down
its acquisition of Rome Cable Company, a relatively small specialty
manufacturer of copper products. Not, that is, if bigness of the acquir-
ing company is the standard of illegality under section 7 of the Clayton
Act. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, implies just that
to be the law although there is very little direct reference to size in
his opinion.
The Supreme Court decision must be read together with the dis-
trict court decision which it reverses7o to give full meaning to the hold-
ing of the Court on the question of size. The district court had declared
the merger to be legal, finding Alcoa's acquisition of Rome Cable,
primarily a manufacturer of copper wire and cable products, to be
essentially a product diversification and "know-how" acquisition. 0 Al-
though, in the district court's view, the merger may have produced cer-
tain advantages for the acquiring company, it did not provide ad-
vantages of the type condemned by section 7. "[I]ncrease in its
scientific knowledge" and "diversification of its line of salable prod-
ucts" would seem to be legitimate goals not proscribed by the Clayton
Act, said the court.81
The district court was aware of the size of Alcoa. Reminiscent of
the U.S. Steel case8" of fifty years earlier, the court stated that "care
... must be taken not to exaggerate its influence because of its size
alone, especially in the absence of evidence of the abuse of the power
which goes with size .... The mere intrusion of 'bigness' into a com-
petitive market will not in itself violate the statute."83
Measuring the facts of the case against the total battery of tests
prescribed in Brown Shoe, the court concluded that the required sub-
stantial lessening of competition or tendency towards monopoly was
not shown.
Critical to the lower court decision was the determination of the
relevant product markets involved. The court painstakingly considered
ten potential markets and submarkets, weighed each against the prod-
uct market indicia of Brown Shoe, and made findings as to what con-
79 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
80 Alcoa is described by the Supreme Court as "a leader in markets in which economic
power is highly concentrated. Prior to the end of World War I it was the sole producer
of primary aluminum and the sole fabricator of aluminum conductor. It was held in
1945 to have monopolized the aluminum industry in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act." 377 U.S. at 277.
81 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 79, at 519.
82 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
83 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 79, at 515.
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stituted actual "lines of commerce" in this case. 4 The court concluded
there was no substantial overlap nor were there substantial competing
products between Alcoa and the acquired company. The merger was
upheld.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the trial court in its deter-
mination of relevant markets. By redefining certain of the product
markets and submarkets, the Court was able to construct a submarket
in which Alcoa and Rome competed. The Court concluded that the
acquisition added a 1.3 percent share of this reconstructed submarket
to Alcoa's premerger share.85 This sliver the Court found "reasonably
likely to produce a substantial lessening of competition within the
meaning of § 7." On this basis, the Court ordered divestiture, accom-
plishing the "preservation of Rome," rather than permitting "its ab-
sorption by one of the giants."86 The Court stated that the continued
presence of small competitors was necessary to thwart the tendency
towards oligopoly in the aluminum industry. Pointing out that Rome
was "an aggressive competitor" and a "pioneer in aluminum insula-
tion," Mr. Justice Douglas said: "Rome seems to us the prototype of
the small independent that Congress aimed to preserve by section 7.2'8T
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Supreme Court, in
viewing the Alcoa-Rome merger, was much moved by the hugeness of
the acquirer, the shadow of the old Aluminum Company monopoly,
and the smallness of the acquired. It thus decided the merger must not
be sustained. The redefinition of the product markets was a convenient
bridge. Apart from this explanation, this writer, like the three dissent-
84 Id. at 509-11. According to Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent to the Supreme Court's
decision, the lower court ruling was
a long and careful opinion, accompanied by meticulous findings of fact and
thoroughly reasoned conclusions of law .. . (in which) the trial judge con-
scientiously applied the standards postulated by this Court in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325, and made detailed findings of fact fully
supporting his determinations.
377 U.S. at 282.
85 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 78, at 280. Conceding the
district court's finding of some competition between aluminum and copper conductors,
the Court nevertheless found submarkets comprised solely of aluminum conductors. First,
the Court found insulated aluminum conductors to comprise a separate submarket due
to its decisive advantages in overhead distribution lines; Rome produced 4.77 of insu-
lated aluminum conductors in 1958. This finding further led the Court to construct another
broader submarket comprised of both bare and insulated aluminum conductor used in
overhead electrical utility lines (transmission and distribution), in which line of commerce
the Court ultimately found a substantial lessening of competition.
86 Id. at 281.
87 Ibid.
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ing Justices, "find[s] it difficult to understand the Court's conclusion
and impossible to agree with it." The district court had done "a careful
and thoughtful job. It applied the proper law, and its reasoning seemed
sound. .... 2,8
The lower court opinion noted that "the Government's contention
as to the dominance of Alcoa appears to rest upon size alone without
evidence as to the exercise of the power that goes with it." 9 So also
does the majority opinion of the Supreme Court. Rome Cable is a
"size" case.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.90
This case is primarily an affirmation of the applicability of merger
law to joint ventures, and secondarily an expression of the Court's
views on the relevance of potential competition under section 7. Also,
the case is of interest on the issue of size, and how size relates to both
the concept of potential competition and the device of joint ventures.
Olin Mathieson and Pennsalt, two corporations engaged in manu-
facturing and selling somewhat related lines of chemicals, had each
considered independently the possibility of entering the southeastern
region of the United States with a sodium chlorate facility. They de-
cided instead to form jointly the Penn-Olin Chemical Company, a fifty-
fifty joint venture, to carry on that business. The lower court upheld
the venture as legal, holding that it could not be reasonably concluded
that both parents would have entered the market had there been no
joint venture. It stated that there was no reason to suppose that the
joint venture would be a less effective competitor than either parent
alone would be. In fact, the lower court thought the contrary was likely.
The Supreme Court remanded, concluding first, as a matter of
law, that the creation of a joint venture is a transaction subject to sec-
tion 7. Secondly, it felt that the court erred in failing to make a finding
as to the reasonable probability of either of the parents entering the
market while the other remained a potential entrant. The Court's de-
scription of the facts does take note of the absolute size of both parent
companies (Olin with assets and sales of about three-quarter billion
dollars, Pennsalt about 100 million dollars). Also, the Court, in allud-
ing to the importance of potential competition, stated:
The existence of an aggressive, well equipped and well financed cor-
poration engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting
88 Id. at 284.
89 Supra note 79, at 515.
90 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
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anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be a substantial
incentive to competition which cannot be underestimated. 91
And finally, among the criteria which the Court listed for the guidance
of the trial court on remand were: (1) the power of the competitors in
the relevant market, (2) the power of the joint venturers, (3) the
power of each in dealing with the competitors of the other, and (4) the
potential power of the joint venture in the relevant market.
Thus, joint venture activity, on the part of large companies, seems
highly suspect, at least in any market in which either parent is a sub-
stantial potential competitor. It is even possible that an unduly broad
definition of what constitutes "potential" competition could transform
the Penn-Olin decision into a virtual per se ruling against joint ven-
tures where the parent companies are large.
United States v. Continental Can Co.92
In 1956, Continental Can Company, the nation's second largest
producer of metal containers, acquired Hazel-Atlas Glass Company,
the nation's third largest producer of glass containers. The Govern-
ment's request for a divestiture order under section 7 of the Clayton
Act was denied by the district court.
The lower court found that metal containers and glass containers
constituted two different lines of commerce. Although each of the par-
ticipants to the merger was a major factor in one of these lines, neither
was in both. However, the court did recognize a certain amount of
vigorous "inter-industry" competition. The district court. found that
the government had failed to prove a reasonable probability of anti-
competitive effect in any one line of commerce, and accordingly it dis-
missed the complaint.9"
The Supreme Court, presented with the same economic facts,
decided to combine glass and metal containers into one relevant market,
thus, in theory at least, bringing the merged companies into competi-
tion with one another. This supported a finding of a reasonable prob-
ability of anticompetitive effect in the broader product market.94
91 Id. at 174.
92 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
93 United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
94 The district court traced the competitive interplay between glass and metal
containers. Baby food, at one time packed entirely in metal cans, had shifted to the
use of glass almost exclusively. Conversely, the soft drink business had been considered
as predominantly a glass container industry and was then in the process of moving
toward the use of metal cans. The court also took note of the intense competitive battle
in behalf of the beer can and beer bottle being waged by the respective industries and
individual manufacturers.
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Having deemed the single combined market to be the relevant one,
the Court concluded that the size and share-of-market statistics of the
industry easily supported a finding of violation. 5 The Court saw no
necessity to inquire beyond the indicia of bare size, stating: "Where a
merger is of such a size as to be inherently suspect, elaborate proof of
market structure, market behavior and probable anticompetitive effects
may be dispensed with in view of § 7's design to prevent undue concen-
tration."96 The Court also takes note of the fact that "the resulting
percentage of the combined firms approaches that held presumptively
bad in [the Philadelphia Bank case and] the incremental addition to
the acquiring firm's share is considerably larger than in [Rome
Cable] .",7
The dissent objects to the Court's combining two distinct lines of
commerce in order to invent a third one "the existence of which no one,
not even the Government, has imagined; for which businessmen and
economists will look in vain; a line of commerce which sprang into
existence only when the merger took place and will cease to exist when
the merger is undone."98 The dissent particularly criticizes the adoption
of the "shortcut" Philadelphia Bank analysis when the merger is be-
tween companies of only "related" industries. Dissenting Justice
Harlan concludes that the Court has, in effect, laid down "a per se rule
that mergers between two large companies in related industries are
presumptively unlawful under § 7.))99
It is difficult to quarrel with the "per se presumption" character-
ization of this case. Large companies having related product lines
merge at their peril.
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.100
The Consolidated Foods case involves a major retailer's acquisi-
tion of a relatively small processor of seasonings. A generally unsucess-
ful attempt was thereafter made to pressure the acquiring company's
95 The Court said:
Continental's major position in the relevant product market-the combined
metal and glass container industries-prior to the merger is undeniable. Of the
59 billion containers (glass and metal) shipped in 1955 ...Continental shipped
21.9% . . . . Of the six largest firms in the product market, it ranked second
.... Hazel-Atlas was the third largest glass container manufacturer .... Its
annual sales amounted to $79 million, its assets exceeded $37 million ....
United States v. Continental Can Co., supra note 92, at 459-60.
96 Id. at 458.
97 Id. at 461.
98 Id. at 476-77.
99 Id. at 476.
100 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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suppliers into satisfying their seasoning needs with purchases from the
newly acquired subsidiary. The Court held that coerced reciprocity
made possible by such an acquisition "is one of the congeries of anti-
competitive practices at which the antitrust laws are aimed."'01 The
retailer's acquisition of the processing company under the circum-
stances of this case was felt to create a probability of reciprocal buying
sufficient to invalidate the merger.
While this case is by no means solely a "size" case, the opinion of
the Court does suggest the relevance of the size of the merging com-
panies, particularly their size relative to that of those against whom
reciprocity pressure may be exerted. The majority opinion states: "We
do not go so far as to say that any acquisition, no matter how small,
violates § 7 if there is a probability of reciprocal buying. Some situa-
tions may amount only to de minimus."'02 The concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Stewart also discloses a sensitivity to size: "The food proc-
essing industry is composed basically of two classes of manufacturers.
One class, which includes such processors as Armour and Swift, has
built significant brand names commanding consumer acceptance of
their products .... A second class incorporates the smaller processors
in the industry."1 3 Presumably Justice Stewart would outlaw only
such reciprocity as involves pressure tactics by a member of the "large
size" group against one of the "juniors."
CONCLUSION
"Mere size is not an offense .... ,,101 Or is it?
Surely the current movement of the law is away from that classic
antitrust doctrine. The Supreme Court's decisions in 1964 almost
add up to a rule of per se illegality for mergers of "large" companies,
a holding that mere size is an offense under the federal merger laws,
regardless of whether power is abused or exercised.
True, it is arguable that in each of the above cases appropriate
economic considerations other than absolute size support the decisions.
Brown Shoe involved a pronounced trend toward concentration; Phila-
delphia Bank and Lexington Bank had a heavy market share with
which to reckon; El Paso had a virtual monopoly, albeit regulated;
Rome Cable raised the spectre of a yesteryear monopolist; Penn-Olin
had the potential competition aspect; Continental Can the overlapping
of related product lines; and Consolidated Foods involved the reci-
101 Id. at 594.
102 Id. at 600. (Emphasis added.)
103 Id. at 607.
104 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932).
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procity gimmick. But in all, the Court's prepossession with size seems
very evident.
To be sure, no court has yet gone so far as to specifically hold that
mere size invalidates a merger. But does mere size ever really exist? Is
there such a thing as absolute size without its inevitable complement
of side effects? The Federal Trade Commission disclaimed size as its
basis for invalidating the Proctor & Gamble merger; instead the deci-
sion was attributed to the quantity discount advantages and financial
strength gained from size. This is like permitting the shooting of tigers
but only if they have no stripes. Size does not exist in a vacuum. Un-
marked tigers are pretty rare.
If the FTC opinion in Procter & Gamble reaches the United States
Supreme Court, and if that Court adopts the philosophy that efficiencies
of scale, quantity discounts, and other paraphernalia of size are to be
numbered among the "congeries" of anticompetitive strength which
section 7 was designed to guard against, big business will be virtually
foreclosed from any growth by merger.
And if mergers involving large companies are to cease, will this
not just about bring an end to corporate buying and selling of assets
and stock? It is the large companies which constitute the most likely
buyers of salable businesses3 °0
But the Court has not yet endorsed the FTC decision in Procter
& Gamble, nor has it been called upon to consider the pure con-
glomerate. One still need not conclude that the Supreme Court will
concoct an instant merger test based on size alone.106 Instead, the
105 Address by Carl Kaysen, The Impact of Antitrust on Economic Growth,
National Industrial Conference Board, March 4, 1965. He pointed out that "if those
buyers [the largest 100] are removed from the market [as potential acquirers], perhaps
the average price that sellers will realize for their assets will be lower." The cost of
such an anti-merger policy could fall on the small and medium size firms rather than
the big ones.
Another student of business has noted that mergers are a wholesome stimulant to
economic growth.
Quite often a small businessman will start a new venture in the expectation
that if it flourishes, and for some reason he does not choose to stay in the
business, he can sell out at a profit. If he sees this ultimate "right of exit"
endangered by antimerger decisions, he is likely to become a good deal less
venturesome.
Address by M.J. Rathbone, supra note 9.
100 Dissents, of course, do not make current law. But sometimes they do presage
the future. Twenty years ago Mr. Justice Douglas, distressed at what he deemed to be
favors shown big business in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.. 293, 317-18
(1948), complained:
[When it comes to 'monopolies built in gentlemanly ways-by mergers, pur-
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Court may continue to hold as it did in Brown Shoe: there is no quick
and easy analysis of what complies with and what violates section 7,
but rather there must be undertaken a functional, meaningful study of
each merger in the context of its industry and in the full light of ob-
jective, open-minded criteria. The probable lessening of competition
and the tendency to monopolize required to be proven by the Clayton
Act should be established by the showing of something more than((mere size." The importance of continuing to stimulate the vigor of
American economy, large and small firms alike, would seem to call for
only the most careful application of the brakes to the expanding busi-
ness activity of important companies.
It is to be hoped that sound economic analysis will prevail over
the occultism of antitrust by the numbers.
chases of assets or control and the like-the teeth have largely been drawn
from the Act.
The lessons Brandeis taught on the curse of bigness have largely been
forgotten in high places. Size is allowed to become a menace to existing and
putative competitors. Price control is allowed to escape the influences of the
competitive market and to gravitate into the hands of the few, but beyond all
that there is the effect on the community when independents are swallowed up
by the trusts and entrepreneurs become employees of absentee owners .... These
are the prices the nation pays for the almost ceaseless growth in bigness on
the part of industry.
With the current wave of Supreme Court decisions striking down every'large com-
pany acquisition presented to it, Justice Harlan has now taken Justice Douglas' place
as the strong dissenter, objecting to "the bludgeon with which the Court now strikes
at combinations which may well have no fault except 'bigness"' and complaining
of the "travesty of economics" and "mock-statistical analysis" indulged in by the Court
to justify the anti-bigness decisions.
Perhaps the pendulum will come to rest somewhere between those two viewpoints
and the big business components of the nation will neither "wax strong" in the light
of special favor from the Court nor be "bludgeoned" for the sole sin of bigness.
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